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How German Rearmament Could Make the EU a Military Power

Photo: German Armed Forces/Marco Dorow


Modern Germany, due to its involvement in both World Wars and the Cold War, has long supported pacifism and the rules-based international order, but recently has shifted dramatically and now plans to have the strongest conventional military in Europe by 2039. 


Post-War German military doctrine

Although Postwar Germany is often described as pacifist, this label is more philosophical than material, as West Germany played a significant role in Europe's Cold War security system, allocating nearly 5% of its GDP to military spending. This philosophical pacifism refers to Germany’s reluctance to participate in overseas military action and its constitutional ban on waging wars of aggression. This stands out in contrast to allies like France and the United States (US), which have frequently participated in armed conflicts worldwide since the end of World War II. 


German pacifism grew stronger in the 1990s due to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany's reunification, and the collapse of the Soviet Union and its European satellites, which made the ideals of The End of History popular across Germany. The End of History as an ideology states that Democratic Liberalism was the final stage of societal development, that all nations would adopt these principles, and that the era of conflict, which had shaped human history for thousands of years, was over. This view also led many Germans to believe that the Bundeswehr (the German Army) was obsolete, since they were no longer under any threat, and that Germany would not participate in overseas military action; this marked the beginning of a long period of underinvestment in the Bundeswehr, turning it into a second-class military in Europe. 


Today, Germany is primarily an economic and industrial power in Europe, while France continues to be Europe’s military leader, being the only EU country with nuclear deterrence and frequently participating in overseas conflicts, providing its armies with valuable operational experience. However, if Germany’s plans succeed, this balance within Europe will be upended, with Germany becoming the continent’s leading economic and military power.


Zeitenwende

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is often cited as the main reason for Germany’s strategic shift. When Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared a Zeitenwende or an epochal shift in English, in 2022, he freed up €100 billion for military spending. In 2026, the German government published its public military strategy, which, for the first time since the Cold War, stated that the country must be capable of fighting a large-scale conventional war against a near-peer adversary. It also highlights how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed that the Putin regime aims to dismantle the post-war European security structure and how Russia views military force as a legitimate means to do so. Especially worrying for Germany is Russia’s new hybrid warfare strategy, which combines clandestine destabilisation efforts, airspace incursions, and cyber-attacks, blurring the lines between peace and war, as well as between military and civilian targets. This is particularly important to Germany, as its military is constrained by strict laws that distinguish between peacetime and wartime.

In addition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Trump administration’s new geopolitical stance has significantly influenced Germany’s decision to rearm. President Trump’s gamble for Greenland shocked Germany, as it realised that the rules-based international order was being disrespected not only by adversaries but also by its closest ally, the US. Additionally, the Third Gulf War showed Germany that America would pursue its own agenda independently of its allies, even if it had negative consequences for them. Trump also repeatedly questioned the definition of NATO’s Article 5, which covers collective defense, and called the organisation a “paper tiger,” adding to German policymakers’ worries.  


The wider EU implications

As the reasons for German rearmament do not seem likely to disappear, Germany is expected to spend over €150 billion in 2029, nearly double what France will spend. This will upend the current balance in Europe, as France simply does not have the GDP or fiscal space to match, with a GDP that is 20% smaller than Germany’s and a debt-to-GDP ratio nearly double Germany’s; France will be outclassed in a matter of years. Although the era of fears around German militarism is over, France genuinely worries about German industrial competition. France, the world’s second-largest arms exporter and the third-largest to Europe, worries that German weapons companies will soon be able to produce higher-quality and cheaper weapons systems than France, while also reinforcing their automotive advantage across the continent. 


In addition, French military experts criticise the EU for freeing up billions by removing debt breaks without establishing a European-wide arms procurement program. They contend this will lead countries to develop similar weapons systems and compete against each other, wasting resources instead of addressing the capability gaps caused by the US’s withdrawal, and focusing on industries where these countries are already leaders. 

An EU program should be created to coordinate weapons research, production, and funding, in which EU countries are legally required to spend within the Union, supporting local arms manufacturers instead of American giants. Furthermore, this program would also eliminate significant resource waste by ending the development of nearly identical weapons systems within the EU. It would also reduce production and maintenance costs, as weapons systems would be standardized and manufactured on a continental scale, enabling the sharing of spare parts and the benefits of economies of scale. The project could also include nuclear deterrence, allowing countries to pay to expand the French nuclear umbrella, thereby increasing the legitimacy of deterrence and freeing up much-needed fiscal space for France. This system would make Europe’s armies more credible as a deterrent to Russian aggression, promote European strategic autonomy, and help revive European manufacturing and automotive industries. Now, it is up to the French government to set aside its pride, acknowledge the benefits of coordination, and accept that it cannot compete alone. France being the more reticent of the two European powers when it comes to closer European arms development. 






Sources:

German “Pacifism” and the Zeitenwende by Frank A. Stengel :: SSRN, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5164607. Accessed 9 July 2026. 

Germany and France Warn Trump against Taking over Greenland, www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg9gvg3452o. Accessed 9 July 2026. 

Germany Is Building a Big Scary Army, www.economist.com/europe/2025/06/04/germany-is-building-a-big-scary-army. Accessed 9 July 2026. 

Germany Says US Troop Withdrawal “foreseeable” as NATO Seeks Clarification, www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd9pn541jjlo. Accessed 9 July 2026. 

Germany’s New Defense Strategy - YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=4gn5QCmWWQY. Accessed 9 July 2026. 

Haunted by the End of History: The Making of Modern Europe - LSE, www.lse.ac.uk/research/research-for-the-world/society/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-history-a-philosophical-exploration-of-modern-europe. Accessed 9 July 2026. 

Les Experts : Allemagne, Le Réarmement à Crédit Pour Sauver l’ue - 07/07, www.bfmtv.com/economie/replay-emissions/les-experts/video-les-experts-allemagne-le-rearmement-a-credit-pour-sauver-l-ue-07-08_VN-202607070372.html. Accessed 9 July 2026. 

Never Again Meets a New War - New Eastern Europe, neweasterneurope.eu/2026/02/23/never-again-meets-a-new-war/. Accessed 9 July 2026. 

Turning Point or Turning Back: German Defence Policy after Zeitenwende – European Council on Foreign Relations, ecfr.eu/article/turning-point-or-turning-back-german-defence-policy-after-zeitenwende/. Accessed 9 July 2026. 

  

 
 
 

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